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that fuels crime and terror over the region" (p. 151).

The book needs a broader title and a clearer identification of its audience. For the specialist there is little new to learn from the often too general statements the author makes about crime and control in Asia and the Pacific. The omissions are unfortunately far more remarkable than the contributions. I think this book is still in need of some heavy editing and a much clearer focus.

Crime in an Insecure World, by **Richard V. Ericson**. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007. 256pp. \$19.95 paper. ISBN: 0745638295.

TORIN MONAHAN
Arizona State University
torin.monahan@asu.edu

These are times of volatile uncertainty. From threats of terrorism to environmental disaster to economic vulnerability, uncertainty reigns supreme. It has, Ericson argues, become its own form of governance, supplanting regimes of risk management that characterized the latter half of the twentieth century. As described in this book, the dominant responses to uncertainty—which include science, surveillance, and the law—are not only woefully ill-equipped to mitigate it, but they actually amplify and reproduce uncertainties, leading to a greater sense and experience of insecurity. In this context, criminalization proliferates across all domains as a discernable effort by policymakers, the courts, and law enforcement agencies to establish certainty, or at least the appearance of control. The effect, however, is the gradual dismantling of the social contract, throwing societies into what Ericson characterizes as a retreat from "the liberal social imaginary" and into the chaotic and destructive tentacles of an untamed "biblical" Leviathan, as opposed to the well-governed one written about by Hobbes.

Ericson traces the operations of "governance through uncertainty" across four domains: national security, social security, corporate security, and domestic security. In each domain, he finds a politics of uncertainty that is responded to and constituted by two different forms of "counter-law," which he calls "law against law" and "surveillant assemblages," respectively. He writes:

Counter-law I entails the creative development of laws that counter the traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law. . . . [It] seeks to reduce or eliminate due process protections that create uncertainty in investigations. It also increases the discretionary capacity for preemptive strikes against the suspicious, including incapacitation and severe punishment. Counter-law II involves broader and deeper surveillant assemblages that cast widely for signs of threat in the hope of preempting disasters waiting to happen. (P. 207)

Both forms of counter-law signal the increasing institutionalization of precautionary logics and crime control, especially by institutions other than the criminal justice system (e.g., healthcare, welfare, the corporation, and the family). Thus, responsibility for contending with (potential) crimes is distributed throughout society.

The examples provided by Ericson serve as representations of ongoing neoliberal trends, rather than as entirely new phenomena. In the national security domain, "law against law" can take the form of the USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, allowing for greater discretionary power on the part of the executive and the restriction of civil rights and liberties. In the social security domain, it can include the criminalization of people on welfare or people filing for disability or workers' compensation benefits. With corporate security, law against law can be witnessed with what Ericson counterintuitively calls the "unjust criminalization" of individuals working in corporations that have committed egregious crimes (p. 129). And, in the domain of domestic security, laws targeting anti-social behavior and transience can be interpreted as law against law.

Surveillant assemblages, according to Ericson, reinforce "law against law," thereby contributing to a neoliberal social order of individual responsibility, vulnerability, and insecurity. With national security, surveillance imperatives have altered the missions and practices of public and private institutions, while government programs have recast citizens as civilian-soldiers who can best prepare for disaster through consumption and vigilance. In the domain of social security, risk is increasingly individualized and those accessing public services are closely scrutinized with

a heterogeneous assemblage of databases, caseworkers, video surveillance, private investigators, and community members. Corporate security has been colonized by systems of audit, compelling workers to retreat into positions of "defensible compliance" rather than engage in self-reflexive and innovative responses to crises. Domestic security, in its turn, is governed by a precautionary logic, whereby surveillance, private security forces, sex-offender databases, child-protection systems, and architectural fortification are used to exclude and marginalize those seen as posing a risk to an increasingly fragmented social order.

Although insights such as the ones articulated in this book will not be new to scholars who have been attentive to contemporary mutations in governance and social control, Ericson has succeeded in integrating disparate theories and examples into a remarkably coherent and well-organized text. He provides a valuable overview of literatures, replete with excellent quotations, and communicates using clear and precise sentences. Additionally, each of the core chapters adopts the same organizational structure, making the development of his argument easy to follow across the four primary domains covered. In short, this is a text that will appeal to academics while being perfectly suited for adoption in undergraduate courses.

Crime, Drugs and Social Theory: A Phenomenological Approach, by **Chris Allen**. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007. 154pp. \$99.95 cloth. ISBN: 9780754647423.

JAMES D. ORCUTT
Florida State University
jorcutt@fsu.edu

This is an ambitious little book. In the space of 130 pages of text, Chris Allen offers a critique of conventional research on causal relationships between drug use and crime, a review of relevant sociological theories of deviance, an explication of phenomenological arguments about the nature and study of everyday experience, an examination of the limitations of social scientific epistemology, a qualitative analysis of patterns of drug use, criminal activity, and personal crisis in a sample of heroin users, and an impassioned con-

demnation of governmental policies that misunderstand and mismanage the tragic consequences of social deprivation and economic marginalization in working-class areas of post-industrial Britain. Does he succeed in all this? Almost. This is a laudable effort to break through the constraints of positivist inquiry into drug-crime connections; yet, it is marked by analytical and stylistic lapses that may limit its impact on sociological thought and applied work on this problem.

The empirical chapters at the heart of this work are based on interviews with 77 heroin users from "deprived areas" of Manchester, UK, who allegedly had been involved in violent acquisitive crime, although shoplifting appears to predominate among most of them. An important part of Allen's phenomenological methodology was to ask respondents "to tell *their side of the story* about involvement in crime and drugs *using their own words* and by explaining *how it really happened and how they felt* when they were 'in the thick of things'" (p. 14, emphasis in original). His intent here was to evoke first order accounts of drug use and crime, which are untainted by the objectified language of "reasoned reasons" for acts of deviance ("I did it because . . .") that social scientists typically employ in their second order explanations of social conduct. Indeed, many of his respondents simply stated that episodes of theft or other crimes "just happened" or that "we had nothing else to do, so we just done it." This leads Allen to conclude that second order causal accounts of social scientists, which view the landscape of social action from a spatial and temporal distance, cannot adequately capture drug users' "non-reasoned," unselfconscious involvement in deviant activity. In the course of this analysis, Allen makes some insightful points about the epistemological shortcomings and political implications of social science discourse regarding causal connections between drug use and crime.

However, it is fair to ask whether Allen's reliance on interviews, which were conducted at a spatial and temporal distance from the "thick of things," similarly poses epistemological problems in accounting for the situated actions of his respondents. Retrospective "stories" such as these may elide or gloss situationally emergent meanings and detailed sequences of action that might be more faithfully rendered through direct observation. This